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HIS Article reviews legislative and case law developments in the ar-
eas of wills, nontestamentary transfers, heirship, estate administra-
tion, guardianships, and trusts. The Survey period covers decisions
published between November 1, 1990, and October 31, 1991, as well as
changes to the Probate Code, the Property Code, and other codes and stat-
utes enacted by the Seventy-Second Texas Legislature that impact on the
areas of estate planning and probate.
I. WILLS
A. Will Construction
The Texas supreme court, in McGill v. Johnson,' held that language in a
will that provided a gift to the testator's sisters following the death of the
testator's son, if the son died without a natural child born in wedlock, cre-
ated a vested remainder subject to a condition subsequent.2 In contrast, the
court of appeals had held that the language created a contingent remainder.3
The supreme court interpreted the language in such a manner that the sis-
ters' remainder interest vested at the earliest possible date, with only their
right to possession and enjoyment deferred until the son's death.4 The
supreme court also held that the open mine doctrine applied to the oil and
gas leases, both in the trust and in the son's life estate following termination
of the trust.5 The testator executed numerous mineral leases, which became
* B.A., University of Texas at Arlington; M.L.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University.
Attorney at Law, Taylor & Mizell, Dallas, Texas.
1. 799 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1990).
2. Id. at 675, 677. The will provided that the son would receive the real property held in
the trust when he reached age forty if he had married and had a child born in wedlock by that
time; if he had not married and had a child born in wedlock, the son would receive a life estate
in the real property with a remainder to the testator's two sisters. If the son married and had a
child born to the marriage after he attained age forty, the son would receive the real property
outright.
3. 775 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989). For a discussion of the opinion of
the court of appeals, see Lynne McNiel Candler, Wills and Trusts, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 301, 304 (1990).
4. 799 S.W.2d at 675. The court found that the language failed to manifest the testator's
intent that the remainder not vest until the son's death and, absent the testator's express intent,
Texas courts should construe a remainder interest as vested rather than contingent if possible.
Id. The court also found that the remainder interest at issue in this case was a vested remain-
der subject to divestment because the condition that the son receive the real property outright
if he married and had a natural child after he reached age forty came after the creation of the
remainder interest in the will. Id., citing Pickering v. Miles, 477 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tex. 1972).
5. 799 S.W.2d at 677. The court affirmed this portion of the court of appeals decision.
See 775 S.W.2d at 833. The open mine doctrine provides that a life tenant may receive all
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part of the trust estate following his death. Under the terms of the will,
the trustee specifically had the power to execute new mineral leases. The
supreme court concluded that the testamentary trust for the son's benefit did
not preclude application of the open mine doctrine and that the son should
receive all proceeds from the leases during his lifetime. 6
In Jacobs v. Sellers7 the Beaumont court of appeals examined a decedent's
will in order to classify the bequests under the will for purposes of apportion-
ing debts, administration expenses, and taxes. The testator made several
specific gifts of personal property under the terms of sections (a) through (e)
of paragraph IV of her will. The testator provided in paragraph VIII of her
will that after distribution of the specific legacies contained in paragraph IV
she wished for the remainder of her estate to be "operated as an entity...
until such time as the payment of all taxes and debts ... and that no distri-
bution be made hereunder until such time as this has been accomplished."'8
The appeals court concurred with the trial court's finding that the decedent
intended for all of her estate, except for the specific legacies contained in
sections (a) through (e) of paragraph IV, to bear proportionate shares of
debts, administration expenses, and estate and inheritance taxes.9
In Hudson v. Hopkins 10 the Tyler court of appeals construed a gift of the
residue made to two individuals and the estate of Dr. Sam H. Brock, Sr.,
holding that the gift to Dr. Brock's estate was a valid gift."I A controversy
arose between the executor of the testator's estate and the beneficiaries of Dr.
Brock's estate. The executor thought that the will meant that the residue
would be divided into three equal shares, with two shares passing to the
individual beneficiaries and the third share passing to Dr. Brock's estate, in
turn to be divided among its beneficiaries. The beneficiaries of Dr. Brock's
estate argued that the will evidenced the testator's intent to divide his resi-
due into four equal shares, with one equal share passing to the two individu-
als named in the will and the other two equal shares passing to the two
beneficiaries of Dr. Brock's estate. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the executor, and the beneficiaries of Dr. Brock's estate
appealed. The court of appeals found that the will, in making a gift of one-
third of the residue to Dr. Brock's estate, was not ambiguous as a matter of
law. ' 2
income from mineral interests, including bonuses and royalties, if the lease were in effect at the
time of the creation of the life estate. If the open mine doctrine did not apply, the life tenant
could receive the income from the leases only, with all bonuses added to the remainder estate.
6. 799 S.W.2d at 677.
7. 798 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ granted).
8. Id. at 27.
9. Id. at 28-29.
10. 799 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no writ).
11. Id. at 787. The will provided a gift of the residue to the two individuals and the estate
"to be divided equally between the beneficiaries in fee simple." Id. at 784.
12. Id. at 786. The court noted that the testator chose the estate as the beneficiary rather
than the two beneficiaries of the estate, that the testator intended to treat the estate as a single
beneficiary to receive one-third of the residue, and that the use of the term "estate" in a com-
mon manner rather than in a technical manner indicated the testator's intent to treat the gift to
the beneficiaries of the estate as a joint gift rather than making individual gifts to those benefi-
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In Nail v. Thompson 13 the Fort Worth court of appeals construed the
terms of a will and determined that the testator's adopted family members
could not be remainder beneficiaries of the testamentary trust. 14 The testa-
tor provided for distribution of the trust assets to the "lawful heirs... born
of the body"' 5 of the trust beneficiaries. The appeals court held that the trial
court correctly examined state law at the time the testator made her will to
determine the meaning of the testator's language. 16 The appeals court found
that since the will did not include ambiguous language, the trial court could
properly grant summary judgment. 17 The appeals court also held that the
trustees did not owe the adopted descendants of the trust beneficiaries a fidu-
ciary duty because those persons were not beneficiaries of the trust.18 The
dissent argued that the language of the will created an ambiguity as to
whether the testator intended for the provision relating to children born to
the beneficiaries should also extend to later generations. 19
In West Texas Rehabilitation Center v. Allen 20 the Austin court of ap-
peals determined that, under the terms of the will, the executor improperly
distributed funds to West Texas Rehabilitation Center.2' The will provided
for a specific cash bequest of $10,000 to West Texas Rehabilitation Center,
as well as an additional $20,000 in cash bequests to other named benefi-
ciaries. The will then provided that if the testator had more money available
for distribution than the $30,000 total of the cash bequests, the executor
should distribute all of the additional funds to West Texas Rehabilitation
Center. The estate had almost $58,000 in cash, as well as approximately
$133,950 in priced investments in a Merrill Lynch account. The executor
determined that the entire value of the Merrill Lynch account, including the
priced investments, should be distributed to West Texas Rehabilitation
Center. The other beneficiaries of the estate filed suit against the executor
alleging that only the cash and the cash management account funds in the
Merrill Lynch account should be available for distribution to West Texas
Rehabilitation Center. The trial court agreed with these beneficiaries and
found that the executor distributed almost $121,000 in excess of what he
should have distributed to West Texas Rehabilitation Center. The appeals
ciaries. Id. The court also examined the opinion in Haile v. Holtzclaw, 414 S.W.2d 916, 927
(Tex. 1967), which held that a deed could validly convey real property to an estate, and deter-
mined that a will may also convey property to an estate. 799 S.W.2d at 786-87. As a result,
the gift to the estate indicated the testator's desire that the gift should pass to the beneficiaries
of the estate under the terms of Dr. Brock's will. Id.
13. 806 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
14. Id. at 600, 601.
15. See id. at 600.
16. Id. The court determined that the testator clearly intended to exclude adopted de-
scendants of the trust beneficiaries from receiving distribution of trust assets upon termination
of the trust because of the language the testator used in defining the remainder beneficiaries.
Id. at 601.
17. Id. The court stated that the testator could have included adopted remainder benefi-
ciaries by clearly stating her intention to do so in the will. Id.
18. Id. at 602.
19. Id. at 603 (Meyers, J., dissenting).
20. 810 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ).
21. Id. at 871, 874.
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court held that the testator clearly used the words "money" and "funds"
interchangeably to mean that only cash should pass to West Texas Rehabili-
tation Center and that all other property, including stocks, bonds, and mu-
tual funds held as investments in the Merrill Lynch account, should pass
under the residue. 22
In Floyd v. Floyd 23 the El Paso court of appeals held that the testator's
specific identification of his children in his will controlled over a general
definition of children also contained in the will. 24 The testator married a
woman who had a son from a previous marriage, and the couple later had a
child born to their marriage. The testator always treated his stepson as his
own child, and, although the testator never adopted the stepson, he served as
the stepson's guardian for a while and apparently had intended to adopt his
stepson. The testator named both his stepson and his natural son as his
children in his will, and he named both sons to serve as co-executors and co-
trustees under his will. He provided for his children to share equally in the
residue of his estate. The appeals court determined that the testator clearly
intended to treat his stepson as his own son for all purposes of the will,
which the testator repeatedly demonstrated by referring to both sons and by
treating the stepson equally with the natural son and with the testator's
wife. 25
B. Will Contests
In Broach v. BradleyU2 the Eastland court of appeals found that sufficient
evidence existed to support the jury's finding concerning the testator's testa-
mentary capacity, and that the jury's failure to find that someone exerted
undue influence over the testator was not against the preponderance of the
evidence. 27 The testator, although elderly, was a woman of firm resolve, of
sound mind, who understood her business affairs at the time she signed her
will. A friend of the testator, who was a beneficiary under her will, drove the
testator to the lawyer's office and was present when the testator signed her
will, but no evidence existed that the friend exerted undue influence over the
testator. The appeals court found that this evidence was sufficient to demon-
strate that the testator had the requisite capacity for executing a will and
that the friend did not exert undue influence over the testator.28 The appeals
court also found that the trial court did not err in allowing one of the wit-
nesses to the will to testify at trial. 29 During the trial the will proponent
22. Id. at 874. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding attorney's fees to the other beneficiaries. Id.
23. 813 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ requested).
24. Id. at 762.
25. Id. at 761. The court determined that the specific reference to the stepson as being the
testator's son expressed the testator's intention, and this expression controlled over a general
definition of the term "children," which would provide identification for a class of beneficiaries
not otherwise defined in the will. Id. at 761-62.
26. 800 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990, writ denied).
27. Id. at 681.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 679.
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called the notary who had executed the self-proving affidavit as a witness to
the testator's capacity. The contestant, after hearing the notary's evidence
concerning the execution of the self-proving affidavit, first raised the issue
that the self-proving affidavit was invalid because the notary did not prop-
erly take the witnesses' oaths. The proponent then called one of the wit-
nesses to the will in order to prove that the testator executed her will with all
requisite formalities and with full capacity. The contestant objected because
the proponent had not designated the witness prior to trial. The trial court
overruled the contestant's objection and the appeals court affirmed.30
In Holcomb v. Holcomb 31 the Dallas court of appeals found that the con-
testant did not accept assets from the estate under the terms of the will ad-
mitted to probate greater than those to which she would have otherwise been
entitled 32 and that the proponent exerted undue influence over the testator. 33
The proponent and contestant, brother and sister, both initially offered their
father's last will to probate. The daughter later contested the last will and an
earlier will and offered for probate a will executed prior to the last two wills.
The decedent, while in the hospital, executed a will on December 1, 1983, in
which he left the bulk of his estate to his daughter. The decedent and his ex-
wife had divorced in 1969, and had evenly divided their sizable estate be-
tween them at that time. The mother and her son remained very close, but
the mother had strained relations with her daughter, who remained close to
her father. The testator desired to see the estate split equally between his
children and felt that his ex-wife would favor their son, possibly to the exclu-
sion of their daughter. The testator, therefore, determined to leave the ma-
jority of his estate to his daughter. Soon after his release from the hospital
the decedent executed a new will, dated December 19, 1983, in which he left
his estate equally to his two children, with the exception of five rent houses
that he had previously transferred to his daughter. The decedent executed a
third will on February 1, 1984, in which he left all of his estate equally to his
two children, with the five rent houses to be included in the value of his
daughter's half. The testator died less than a month after he executed the
final will. The daughter alleged that her father executed both of the last two
wills as the result of her brother's undue influence. The daughter specifically
alleged that her brother told their father that he would not receive many
assets from his mother and that he would make things equal with his sister
after both their parents died. The jury found that the testator executed both
30. Id. The appeals court noted that the issue of the validity of the self-proving affidavit
did not exist prior to the trial and that the proponent would have to call one of the witnesses to
the execution of the will in order to prove that the testator properly executed her will. Id. The
court also denied the contestant's claim that the testator and witnesses did not execute the will
with the proper formalities. Id. at 680. The proponent's evidence showed that the testator
executed the will in the presence of two witnesses over the age of fourteen and that the testator
was over the age of eighteen years and of sound mind when she signed the will. The court held
that in order to be properly executed a will does not have to meet all of the additional require-
ments for a self-proving affidavit under TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
800 S.W.2d at 680.
31. 803 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
32. Id. at 414.
33. Id. at 415.
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of the last two wills because of undue influence or mistake and that the fa-
ther and son had a confidential relationship. The trial court set aside the
probate of the February 1, 1984, will and admitted the December 1, 1983,
will to probate. The son appealed and asserted that his sister could not con-
test the validity of the February 1 will because she had accepted benefits
under the will. The appeals court found that the son did not establish as a
matter of law that the daughter received more benefits under the probated
will than she would have received under intestacy.34 The appeals court then
found that the jury had sufficient evidence before it to conclude that the
testator was under no undue influence when he executed the December 1,
1983, will.35 Finally, the appeals court found the last two wills invalid be-
cause the testator executed them under undue influence.3 6
In Turk v. Robles 37 the Houston court of appeals found that although the
trial court incorrectly placed the burden of proof in the jury charge,38 the
error was harmless.3 9 The beneficiary of the testator's will, who was not a
relative, but who lived with the testator for many years and took care of her,
offered the testator's will for probate. The testator's nephews contested the
probate of the will and offered a later document that purported to revoke the
will offered for probate. Not long before the testator executed the later doc-
ument, one of her nephews moved the testator from her home to the county
in which the nephew resided. Shortly before her death and after her arrival
in the nephew's county of residence, the testator, who, according to an appli-
cation for guardianship that the nephew filed, was not of sound mind, exe-
cuted a document that purported to be a new will and purported to revoke
all prior wills. At trial, the nephews contended that the beneficiary of the
earlier will had exerted undue influence over the testator to make her sign
the will and that the testator had later revoked the will. The jury found that
the beneficiary of the earlier will had not exerted undue influence over the
testator and that the testator did not have testamentary capacity to execute
the later document, nor did she execute the later document with all requisite
formalities. The nephews appealed, contending that the trial court errone-
ously placed the burden of proof on them to demonstrate that the testator
34. Id. at 414. The court stated that in order to prove an affirmative defense of estoppel
based upon his sister receiving benefits under the will, the son must prove that she received
more under the probated will than she otherwise would have received, which he did not prove.
Id.
35. Id. The court noted that the testator specified those persons whom he wished to serve
as witnesses and that his attending physician not only served as a witness to the will, but also
performed a medical test prior to the execution to determine the testator's mental capacity. Id.
36. Id. at 415. The jury found that the testator relied on his son's representations that the
mother did not convey as much property to their son as the testator thought that she would.
The court noted as follows:
[A] mistake of fact or law alone will not defeat the probate of a will even though
the testator would have made a different will but for the mistake inducing the
making of the will. Coupled with undue influence or fraud perpetrated upon the
testator, such a mistake is sufficient to deny probate of such an instrument.
Id.
37. 810 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
38. Id. at 759.
39. Id. at 759-60.
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revoked the earlier will and that she had testamentary capacity to do so.
The appeals court found that the nephews met their burden of providing
some evidence casting doubt on the continued effect of the earlier will by
giving oral testimony that the decedent revoked the earlier will. 4° The bur-
den then shifted to the will proponent to prove that the testator did not
revoke the will.4 1 The trial court worded two of the questions so that the
nephews improperly had the burden of proof. The appeals court deter-
mined, however, that the error was harmless because the jury found that the
testator did not have capacity to execute the document that purported to
revoke the earlier will.42
In Estate of Kidd43 the Amarillo court of appeals examined the issue of
discovery sanctions in the context of a will contest. A daughter filed a mo-
tion to have her father removed as independent executor of her grand-
mother's estate under Probate Code section 149C(a)" because her father
failed to file an inventory. The daughter later filed a will contest in which
she alleged that her grandmother executed the probated will as the result of
fraud and undue influence and that her grandmother did not have testamen-
tary capacity. The father filed a motion for summary judgment as a counter-
claim and sought recovery of attorney's fees. The daughter filed a motion to
compel her father to produce documents during discovery. The trial court
granted the daughter's motion and assessed attorney's fees against the father.
Both the court of appeals and the supreme court rejected the father's at-
tempts to file a petition for writ of mandamus in connection with the trial
court's assessment of attorney's fees against him. The father finally pro-
duced the first page of the documents that the daughter sought to discover,
and she moved for additional sanctions.45 The trial court awarded the
daughter additional attorney's fees. The daughter eventually filed a motion
for nonsuit in the will contest, which the trial court granted. The daughter
later filed a motion for dismissal of her father's counterclaim because it in-
volved the same issues as the will contest. The trial court granted the daugh-
ter's motion, dismissed the counterclaim, denied the father's request for
attorney's fees, and rendered judgment awarding the daughter attorney's
fees based on the father's discovery abuse. The appeals court first deter-
mined that the trial court properly awarded attorney's fees to the daughter
40. Id. at 758.
41. See id. at 759. The court stated that the trial court must word the jury charge "so that
an affirmative answer indicates that the party with the burden of persuasion on that fact estab-
lished the fact by a preponderance of the evidence." Id.
42. Id. at 760. The court also found that the trial court did not err by refusing to submit
an instruction on fiduciary duty as part of the instruction on undue influence. Id. The court
noted that the trial court followed the holding in Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922
(Tex. 1963), in drafting the jury question and that fiduciary duty is not part of the holding in
Rothermel. 810 S.W.2d at 760. The court cited Spillman v. Estate of Spillman, 587 S.W.2d
170, 172 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) for the proposition that the submis-
sion of an undue influence issue encompasses the presumption raised by evidence that a fiduci-
ary relationship existed between the alleged influencer and the testator. 810 S.W.2d at 760.
43. 812 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, no writ).
44. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149C(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
45. The daughter moved for sanctions under TEX. R. Civ. P. 215.
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because the trial court most likely took judicial notice of the reasonableness
of the attorney's fees and because the father had proper notice and the op-
portunity for a hearing on the award of attorney's fees.46 The appeals court
next found that the trial court properly dismissed the father's counterclaim
because the only new issue in the counterclaim was the father's request for
attorney's fees, which was not a claim for affirmative relief.47 Finally, the
appeals court determined that the trial court did not err in refusing to award
the father his attorney's fees.48
In Frink v. Blackstock 49 a Houston court of appeals overruled the rela-
tor's motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus arising out of a
will contest. 50 The relator, an elderly Kansas resident, was the contestant in
the will contest. During a hearing at which the relator appeared only
through his counsel, the trial court announced an order that the relator
should appear at all subsequent hearings on the contested matters. The rela-
tor then filed his motion for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus.
The relator failed to attach a certified copy of the written order of the court
or of any other pleading in the case. The relator also failed to file a brief
with the court of appeals, apparently because the relator could find no au-
thority to support his position. Finally, the relator failed to state any facts
explaining how the trial court came to issue the order requiring the relator to
appear for hearings on contested matters. Based upon the record, the ap-
peals court determined that it could not find that the trial court had abused
its discretion.51 The dissent, however, would have granted the relator's mo-
tion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus.52
C. Ademption
In Morgan v. Morgan (In re Estate of Crawford) 53 the Amarillo court of
appeals found that the trial court correctly directed a verdict that no ademp-
tion of a specific legacy of stock occurred prior to the testator's death.54 The
decedent gave one of her two sons a power of attorney some four years prior
46. 812 S.W.2d at 359.
47. Id. TEX. R. Civ. P. 162 provides that a plaintiff may take a nonsuit if the plaintiff
timely files the motion for nonsuit and if the defendant has no counterclaim for affirmative
relief.
48. 812 S.W.2d at 360. The court noted that the trial court rendered judgment solely on
the issue of discovery sanctions after dismissing the counterclaim. Id. Accordingly, the trial
court had no action before it on which to base an award of attorney's fees. The appeals court
stated, however, that even if the trial court could have awarded attorney's fees, it would not
have abused its discretion in refusing to do so. Id.
49. 813 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
50. Id. at 604.
51. Id. The court found that the relator had not demonstrated that the trial court's oral
statement constituted an enforceable order and that the trial court could not hold the relator in
contempt for failure to follow its order unless the court had entered a written order. Id.
52. Id. at 604-05 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the majority would be
correct in denying the writ of mandamus based on the record that the relator presented, but
noted that the relator had merely filed a motion for leave to file the writ of mandamus. Id. at
605.
53. 795 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ).
54. Id. at 840.
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to her death, but she continued to manage her financial affairs. Approxi-
mately two months prior to her death, the decedent made a new will in
which she left the son to whom she had previously given the power of attor-
ney all of her cash and certificates of deposit and left her other son all of her
shares of stock. Approximately two weeks prior to her death, the decedent
entered the hospital and the son to whom she had given the power of attor-
ney contacted a stock broker concerning the sale of some of the decedent's
stock. The son and the decedent set up a joint account at the brokerage
house, and the son proceeded to order the sale of the stock. The decedent
died prior to the settlement date for the sale. The son who ordered the stock
sold pursuant to the power of attorney endorsed the check from the sale of
the stock in his capacity as executor, although the court had not yet ap-
pointed him executor, and deposited the proceeds from the sale into his per-
sonal account. He later listed the stock on the inventory of estate assets, but
he refused to pay the proceeds from the sale to his brother because he
claimed the gift of stock was adeemed. The brother sued to recover the
proceeds from the sale of the stock. The trial court determined that the
stock was part of the decedent's estate at the time of her death and directed a
verdict. The other brother appealed, contending that ownership of the stock
passed to the purchaser on the date of sale. The appeals court analyzed the
UCC provisions relating to the transfer of stock55 and determined that no
ademption occurred because the transfer was incomplete at the time of the
decedent's death.56
D. Disclaimer
In Dyer v. Eckols57 a Houston court of appeals held that, unless a statu-
tory provision exists to the contrary, a disclaimer is not a fraudulent trans-
55. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.313(a) (Vernon 1991) (incorporates UCC
§ 8.313(a)).
56. 795 S.W.2d at 838-40. The decedent held certificates of the stock, so the court deter-
mined that TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.313(a)(2) and (6) did not apply since they deal
only with stock not represented by certificates. 795 S.W.2d at 839. The court then concluded
that subsections (8), (9), and (10) did not apply because these subsections deal with the transfer
of investment securities that serve as collateral for an obligation of the owner. Id. Because the
purchaser did not obtain possession of the stock certificates prior to the decedent's death, the
court found that subsection (1) did not apply. Id. at 839-40. Neither the decedent nor her
attorney in fact had actually indorsed the certificates over to the purchaser, so the court found
that subsection (3) did not apply. Id. at 840. The financial intermediary had not identified the
stock in any of its books or records as belonging to the purchaser, so subsection (4) did not
apply, and the certificates were in the possession of a financial intermediary, not a third party,
so subsection (5) did not apply since a third party did not hold the securities for the purchaser.
Id. Finally, no evidence existed that a clearing corporation had any involvement with the
transaction, thus a clearing corporation did not have any entries of the transaction on its
books, which would have made subsection (7) applicable. Id. The court accordingly found
that no transfer of the stock occurred prior to the decedent's death. Id. The court also found
that although the plaintiff brother raised the issues of exemplary damages and the imposition
of a constructive trust at trial, he did not preserve these issues for appeal because he made no
claim either to the trial court or in a point or cross-point of error that the directed verdict
deprived him of recovery on those issues. Id. at 841.
57. 808 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ dism'd by agreement).
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fer. 58 The disclaimant was involved in an automobile accident that resulted
in the death of another woman some four months prior to the death of the
disclaimant's uncle. Three weeks after the uncle's death, the probate court
admitted his will to probate. Under the terms of the will, the uncle left the
disclaimant one-tenth of his residuary estate, which had a value of approxi-
mately $200,000. The disclaimant later executed and delivered a disclaimer
pursuant to Probate Code section 37A.59 Soon after she executed the dis-
claimer, the disclaimant received service of citation in the damage suit re-
sulting from the automobile accident. The plaintiff alleged that the
disclaimant executed the disclaimer as a fraudulent transfer. The trial court
found that as a matter of law a disclaimer can defeat the claims of the benefi-
ciary's creditors and that a disclaimer is not a fraudulent transfer under the
provisions of the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.60 The appeals
court found that a disclaimer relates back to and is effective as of the date of
the decedent's death. 61 The court stated that a disclaimant never possessed
the property disclaimed and thus inferred that a fraudulent transfer of the
disclaimed property could not occur.62 Because the Texas Uniform Fraudu-
lent Transfer Act 63 does not mention disclaimers, a disclaimer is not a trans-
fer under the act.64
E. Revocation
In Dean v. Garcia 65 the Austin court of appeals determined that a testator
had revoked a codicil by writing cancellation language on the codicil. 66 The
testator executed his will and a codicil on the same day. Some months later,
the testator decided to revoke the codicil and discussed the revocation with
his attorney. The attorney advised the testator to indicate his intent to re-
voke the codicil by writing cancellation language on the codicil in his own
handwriting. The testator did so and mailed the codicil to the attorney. 67
The testator died a short time later and the executor filed an application for
probate of the will. The beneficiary under the codicil then filed an applica-
tion for probate of the codicil, and the executor answered, alleging that the
testator revoked the codicil. The trial court admitted the codicil to probate
because it found that the language the testator wrote on the codicil did not
revoke or cancel the codicil. The appeals court disagreed with the trial court
and found as a matter of law that the cancellation language was sufficient to
58. Id. at 535.
59. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A (Vernon Supp. 1992).
60. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a)(1) (Vernon 1987).
61. 808 S.W.2d at 533.
62. Id. at 534.
63. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.002(12) (defines "transfer") and 24.005(a)(1)
(Vernon 1987).
64. 808 S.W.2d at 535.
65. 795 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
66. Id. at 765.
67. The testator wrote the words "CANCILED" [sic] and "VOID" across the dispositive
provision of the codicil, followed by the date and his signature. The testator added language
expressing his intent to cancel the codicil at the bottom of the codicil and again signed and
dated the document. See id. at 764.
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cancel the codicil.68 The appeals court also found that the revocation of the
codicil did not result in the revocation of the underlying will.69
II. NONTESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS
Two cases address the issue of whether a joint bank account was held with
rights of survivorship.70 In Stauffer v. Henderson 1 the Texas supreme court
affirmed both the trial court and the court of appeals72 and held that no right
of survivorship existed in the account at issue. 73 The signature card, which
the decedent and her sister, who was the joint tenant in the account, both
executed, did not expressly provide that the surviving joint tenant would
become the owner of the account.74 The court agreed with prior decisions"5
that Probate Code section 439(a) 76 does not allow parol evidence nor a re-
buttable presumption to create a right of survivorship when the written ac-
count agreement signed by the decedent does not specifically create a
survivorship right.77 The dissent 78 would have held that the agreement cre-
ated a right of survivorship in the decedent's sister.79 The San Antonio
68. Id. at 765. The court found that the fact that the testator wrote words expressing his
intent of voiding and canceling the gift across the dispositive provisions of the codicil was
sufficient to revoke the codicil. Id.
69. Id. at 765-66. The court noted that the revocation of a codicil would not result in the
revocation of the underlying will unless the revocation language expressly revoked the will. Id.
at 765, citing Baker v. Wright, 157 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1941, writ
ref'd) and Logue v. Scrivener, 355 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). The court also noted that the beneficiary under the codicil supported the admis-
sion of the will to probate. 795 S.W.2d at 766.
70. Stauffer v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1990); Martinez v. Martinez, 805 S.W.2d
873 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
71. 801 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1990).
72. 746 S.W.2d 533, 536 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988). For a discussion of the appeals
court's opinion in this case, see Lynne McNiel Candler, Wills and Trusts, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 43 Sw. L.J. 305, 317-18 (1989).
73. 801 S.W.2d at 866.
74. The card provided that the account was a joint account, that both parties could act in
all matters concerning the account, and that the survivor could withdraw the funds in the
account on the death of the first joint tenant. See id. at 859.
75. See Chopin v. InterFirst Bank, 694 S.W.2d 79, 84 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Magee v. Westmoreland, 693 S.W.2d 612, 616 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
76. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992), which applies to rights of
survivorship in joint accounts, states, in part, the following:
Sums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to
the surviving party or parties against the estate of the decedent if, by a written
agreement signed by the party who dies, the interest of such deceased party is
made to survive to the surviving party or parties ..... A survivorship agree-
ment will not be inferred from the mere fact that the account is a joint account.
77. 801 S.W.2d at 865. The thrust of the court's holding is that account agreements for
accounts that provide survivorship rights should plainly state that the account is held in the
names of the depositors with right of survivorship.
78. Id. at 866-72 (Ray, J., dissenting). The dissent discussed the legislative history behind
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a) and concluded that the legislature intended to make no
changes in the common law meaning of "makes to survive," Id. at 866-69. The dissent also
stated that the majority in its opinion destroyed the "common sense approach" of allowing
statements in account agreements to the effect that the funds would be payable to the survivor
to create a rebuttable presumption of survivorship. Id. at 871.
79. Id. at 872.
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court of appeals in Martinez v. Martinez 80 also reached the conclusion that a
signature card did not create a right of survivorship. 81 The signature card,
which both the decedent and her brother, who claimed survivorship rights in
the account, signed, stated that the bank could pay the funds to either joint
depositor, whether before or after the death of the other joint depositor. The
court found that the signature card was not an agreement in writing creating
survivorship rights.82
III. HEIRSHIP
The Texas supreme court, in Dickson v. Simpson, 83 held that the Texas
statutory scheme for establishing paternity violated the petitioner's Four-
teenth Amendment 84 right to establish heirship. 85 The petitioner, who is the
decedent's alleged natural daughter, sought to contest his will. The trial
court found that the petitioner did not have standing to contest the will be-
cause the statute of limitations for establishing her paternity had run. The
court of appeals affirmed. 86 The supreme court concluded that the peti-
tioner never had the opportunity to institute a proceeding for determination
of paternity under chapter 13 of the Family Code, 87 resulting in the violation
of her equal protection right. 88
In Hunter v. Koisch 89 the Beaumont court of appeals held that a testator's
will was not void merely because he executed the will prior to the time that
he adopted an adult child.90 The testator executed a will in 1958 in which he
named his wife as his sole beneficiary. At the time he executed the will the
decedent had no children. In 1973 the decedent and his wife adopted their
niece, who was an adult at the time of the adoption. The decedent died
without executing a will subsequent to the 1958 will, and his wife offered the
will for probate. Following the decedent's death, his wife executed a new
will under which she left her adopted daughter certain property and one-fifth
80. 805 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
81. Id. at 880.
82. Id.
83. 807 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1991).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
85. 807 S.W.2d at 728.
86. Dickson v. Simpson, 781 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989). For a discus-
sion of the opinion of the court of appeals in this case, see Lynne McNiel Candler, Wills and
Trusts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 671, 671-72 (1991).
87. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.01-.09 (Vernon Supp. 1992). At the time of the dece-
dent's death, a natural child could bring an action for determination of paternity only up until
the time the child was twenty years old. Act of May 24, 1983, ch. 744, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen.
Laws 4531. Prior to 1983 the age limits for a child bringing an action for determination of
paternity were even lower than the twenty years. Because petitioner was over fifty years old in
1983, she never had the opportunity to bring an action for determination of paternity.
88. 807 S.W.2d at 727. The court determined that "a statutory classification based on
illegitimacy violates equal protection unless it is substantially related to an important govern-
mental interest." Id. The court then decided that TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.01-.09
(Vernon Supp. 1992), which govern the manner of determination of paternity, bear no substan-
tial relationship to the furtherance of the state's interest in the orderly administration of dece-
dent's estates. 807 S.W.2d at 727.
89. 798 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ denied).
90. Id. at 860.
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of her residuary estate. Following her mother's death, the adopted daughter,
who had qualified as administrator with will annexed of her mother's estate,
filed a petition for determination of heirship in her father's estate. The
daughter contended that under the terms of Probate Code section 67(b)9 1
she should be entitled to a share of her father's estate because his will was
void since he adopted her after the date of his will. The thrust of the daugh-
ter's argument was that, because of the reference to the surviving spouse
being the parent of all of the testator's children "exclusive of adopted chil-
dren,"' 9 2 she could void her father's will as an adopted child even though a
natural child could not. The court disagreed and held that the quoted




In Mower v. Boyer 94 the Texas supreme court held that the judgment of a
probate court exercising dominant jurisdiction may not be collaterally at-
tacked in the district court and that the district court must give effect to the
probate court's order.9 5 In Crawford v. Williams96 the Corpus Christi court
of appeals held that a district court did not have jurisdiction to hear matters
incident to an estate when a county court had previously acquired jurisdic-
91. TEX. PROS. CODE ANN. § 67(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992) provided, at the time that the
daughter filed her application for determination of heirship, that a will is void to the extent
that the testator executed the will when he had no child, either natural born or adopted, but
died following the birth or adoption of a child. Section 67(b) contained an exception to this
rule if the testator left the majority of his estate to his surviving spouse, who was the parent of
all of the testator's children, "exclusive of adopted children." Id.
92. TEX. PROS. CODE ANN. § 67(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
93. 798 S.W.2d at 860. The court thus held that the daughter had no standing to file the
application for determination of heirship and that the father's will was not void. Id. The
dissent would have held that an after-adopted child can void a will under the language of the
statute. Id. at 861.62 (Burgess, J., dissenting).
94. 811 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1991).
95. Id. at 563. A holder of a promissory note sued on the note in district court and
received an interlocutory partial summary judgment against the makers of the note. Following
the partial summary judgment, one of the makers of the note died. The holder sued the dece-
dent's estate on the same note in probate court and the probate court rendered judgment that
the holder take nothing because the note had been fully satisfied. The holder then continued
the district court action. The district court refused to set aside the interlocutory summary
judgment and grant the other maker's summary judgment based on the probate court's order.
The district court rendered judgment against the surviving maker of the note based on the
holder's motions to nonsuit the decedent's estate. The appeals court affirmed the district court
and held that res judicata prevented the surviving maker from raising the issue of satisfaction
in the probate court because he had not previously raised the defense in the district court. 795
S.W.2d 292, 293 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990). The supreme court reversed and
rendered because res judicata did not apply when the district court did not consider the de-
fense of satisfaction in its summary judgment, the probate court exercised its jurisdiction and
rendered a final judgment, and the district court should have barred the holder's relitigation of
the issue when the probate court found that the maker had fully satisfied the note. 811 S.W.2d
at 563.
96. 797 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
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tion over the estate by admitting the decedent's will to probate.97 In Carlisle
v. Bennett 98 the Corpus Christi court of appeals determined that the proper
probate court of Lamb County had exclusive jurisdiction to resolve matters
incident to the settlement of an estate, to the exclusion of the district court in
Cameron County.99 In a mandamus proceeding, the Amarillo court of ap-
peals, in Preston v. Overstreet,00 found that a trial court has discretion to
determine whether to assign a matter to a statutory probate judge rather
than a district court. 101 In Bunnell v. Jordan 102 a Houston court of appeals
determined that the trial court did not err in transferring a suit from district
court to the probate court because the matters at issue arose from a differ-
ence of opinion about the interpretation of a will. 103 In Estate of Torrance v.
97. Id. at 185-86. The constitutional county court of Matagorda County admitted the
decedent's will to probate in 1968. Many years later certain of the decedent's heirs filed suit in
district court in which they requested a partition of the real property contained in the estate,
an accounting, a declaration that the decedent's will was void, and a distribution of the dece-
dent's real property to her heirs. The district court found that the decedent executed the will
as the result of undue influence and set the will aside. The district court then determined
heirship, partitioned the real property to the decedent's heirs, and ordered an accounting. The
court of appeals found that the constitutional county court acquired jurisdiction when it ad-
mitted the will to probate. Id. at 185. The county court thus had jurisdiction over the parti-
tion suit, which was a matter incident to the estate. Id. Although the county court could have
transferred the matter to the district court, the county court did not do so and the district
court could not obtain jurisdiction over the matter even if the county court had not retained
jurisdiction. Id. at 186. The court also held that the portion of the suit attacking the validity
of the will was a "direct attack on the county court's order admitting the will to probate," so
the district court did not have jurisdiction to set the will aside. Id.
98. 801 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
99. Id. at 591-92. The district court in Lamb County ordered the executor of the estate to
sell certain of the estate's real property. The executor sold the real property to her daughter.
One of the beneficiaries of the estate brought an action in Cameron County, alleging that the
executor, acting only in her individual capacity, and her daughter conspired to damage him
through the sale of the real property. The district court in Cameron County agreed with the
executor and her daughter that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter and dismissed the
suit. The appeals court found that the sale of the property was incident to the estate and, in
fact, was directly related to the settlement of the estate, so the appropriate probate court in
Lamb County, whether the county court or the district court, would have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the matter. Id. at 591. The court also noted that the district court in Lamb County
had dominant jurisdiction over the matter because it was the first court to acquire jurisdiction
over the matter. Id. at 592.
100. 802 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ).
101. Id. at 735. The judge of the district court filed a motion to transfer the contested
matter to district court from the Childress County Court and recused himself after the relator
served the judge as a party to the relator's motions. The Childress County judge also recused
himself. The county judge of Potter County heard the motions filed by relator and the district
judge and ordered the transfer of all contested matters to the district court. The relator sought
mandamus relief on the basis that the Potter County judge should have assigned a statutory
probate judge to hear the matters. The appeals court did not determine whether the language
of TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992) mandates the assignment of contested
matters to a statutory probate judge, but instead focused on the fact that the trial judge had
two motions before him and that he had the discretion to determine which of the motions to
grant. Id. The court noted that the legislature has provided no guidance for a judge in the
situation in which a judge faces two motions of equal stature, so the trial judge must exercise
his own discretion. Id.
102. 807 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
103. See id. at 3. The probate court consolidated two actions for trial. The first action,
filed in the probate court by a former attorney for the executor of the estate, was for payment
of legal fees. The second action, filed in the district court by the executor individually and in
2140 [Vol. 45
WILLS & TRUSTS
State 10o4 the El Paso court of appeals held that the probate court had original
jurisdiction over a proceeding determining heirship. 10 5
B. Application for Letters of Administration
In George v. George 106 the Tyler court of appeals held that the trial court
entered an invalid order granting letters of administration because the appli-
cant failed to state in his application for issuance of letters of administration
that the decedent had a surviving spouse. 10 7 The decedent died in 1987,
survived by his spouse. The decedent's brother filed an application for issu-
ance of letters of administration and the court, based upon the application,
entered an order issuing letters of administration to the brother. The dece-
dent's spouse qualified as executor of his estate in a Colorado proceeding
under the terms of the decedent's last will and testament. The brother's
application stated that the decedent died intestate and further contained no
mention of the decedent's surviving spouse. After entry of the order issuing
letters of administration, the surviving spouse brought an appeal by writ of
error.10 8 The spouse alleged that the brother's application did not meet the
requirements of Probate Code section 82109 because the brother failed to list
her capacity as executor, as well as by three corporations wholly owned by the executor, al-
leged that the attorney breached fiduciary duties, which resulted in gross negligence, legal
malpractice, and deceptive trade practices. The probate court entered an order of consolida-
tion and the district court transferred its case to the probate court. The jury found that the
estate should pay the attorney his fees and denied all of the executor's claims. On appeal the
court found that all of the issues involved arose from the settlement of the estate so the probate
court had jurisdiction to hear the matters. Id. The court noted that the executor failed to
establish what claims she brought on behalf of the corporations or how she brought the claims
as a shareholder derivative suit. Id.
104. 812 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
105. Id. at 397. The decedent, who was a resident of New York, died intestate in 1959.
The decedent owned mineral interests in Ector County, Texas, and the public administrator of
the County of New York brought ancillary probate proceedings in the Ector County Court in
October 1972. The State of Texas intervened in 1974 and asserted that the decedent had no
heirs. On July 28, 1975, the decedent's heirs filed an application for determination of heirship
in the county court. The application for determination of heirship listed fifty-six heirs. On
August 13, 1975, the District Court of Ector County entered a judgment escheating the min-
eral property to the State as of the date of the decedent's death. The district court's judgment
did not list the heirs as parties, except through an attorney ad litem, and indicated that all
other parties had withdrawn or abandoned their claims or the court had previously determined
that the parties had no claims. The appeals court indicated that it could not determine
whether the fifty-six heirs listed on the application for determination of heirship filed in the
county court had any notice of the district court proceeding. The court noted that no order
transferring the application for determination of heirship was in the record, so the county
court retained dominant probate jurisdiction. Id. at 395. The court held that the probate
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction for determination of heirship, and that a court must
first make a determination of heirship before a determination of escheat for lack of heirs. Id. at
396-97.
106. 813 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, no writ).
107. Id. at 238.
108. See id. at 237. The surviving spouse demonstrated that she brought her appeal within
six months of the date the trial court entered its order and that she did not participate in the
trial. The court determined that the only additional matter the spouse had to prove was the
whether the record showed error on its face. Id.
109. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 82 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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her as an heir of the decedent. °10 The brother failed to give the spouse any
notice of the proceeding, and she did not attend. As the decedent's surviving
spouse, the spouse would receive preference from the court in its appoint-
ment of an administrator of the decedent's estate. The court concluded that
because the brother failed to notify the trial court of the spouse's existence in
the application, the order authorizing letters of administration was
invalid. I II
C. Executors and Administrators
In Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller 1 12 the Texas supreme court analyzed
the "turnover" statute" 13 in the context of an estate administration and de-
termined that the turnover statute could allow a judgment creditor to reach
assets held by the personal representative of an estate, the judgment debtor,
in her representative capacity, but not in her individual capacity." 4 At the
time of his death, the decedent and his wife jointly owned a $100,000 certifi-
cate of deposit at a bank in Lumberton. The decedent also served as guaran-
tor on promissory notes held by Beaumont Bank totalling almost $200,000.
Shortly after the decedent's death, his widow, who served as independent
executor of his estate, had the proceeds of the certificate of deposit trans-
ferred to her attorney's trust account. At approximately the same time, the
Beaumont Bank contacted the executor and her attorney about having the
estate put up the certificate of deposit as additional collateral against the
promissory notes. The attorney eventually revealed to the bank that the cer-
tificate of deposit had been transferred to his trust account. Soon thereafter,
the notes went into default and the bank filed suit on the notes. The bank
recovered a judgment, then sought turnover relief. The trial court granted
the bank turnover relief for just under $100,000. The appeals court found
that the executor held the proceeds of the certificate of deposit and thus held
the property of a judgment debtor. 1i5 The appeals court held that the turno-
ver statute could only reach the executor in her fiduciary capacity and that
the trial court erred in imposing liability on the executor in both her fiduci-
ary and individual capacities." 16 The dissent expressed the opinion that the
bank had an adequate remedy under Probate Code section 328' '7 so that the
110. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(o) (Vernon Supp. 1992) provides that a surviving spouse
is an heir of the decedent.
111. 813 S.W.2d at 238.
112. 806 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1991).
113. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002 (Vernon Supp. 1992). This statute
provides a method for a judgment creditor to reach a judgment debtor's property that other-
wise could not be readily attached and is not exempt from execution.
114. 806 S.W.2d at 227.
115. Id. at 226. Once the trial court determined that the executor held the assets, the court
held that the burden for the bank to prove that the executor held the assets shifted to the
executor to prove that she no longer had the assets in her possession. Id. The trial court found
that the executor did not prove that she no longer held the proceeds of the certificate of deposit
and the supreme court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so finding. Id.
at 227.
116. Id. at 227.
117. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 328 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1992).
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bank's use of the turnover statute was inappropriate.' 1 8
In Walker v. Sharpe" 9 the Corpus Christi court of appeals held that the
probate court could not enter an order confirming sale of real property with-
out having first entered an order authorizing the sale.120 The widow of a
decedent, allegedly in her capacity as independent executor, sold her home
to a third party. The purchaser later found that the widow had not been
named independent executor in her husband's will and requested the probate
court to enter an order confirming the sale. Other controversies arose be-
tween the widow and the purchaser, which the parties litigated in district
court. The purchaser alleged that the probate court's order confirming the
sale served as res judicata to the district court action. The widow filed a bill
of review and motion in the probate court requesting the court to set aside its
order confirming the sale. The widow alleged that the probate court could
not enter the order confirming the sale without receiving a report of sale and
proper citation and notice. The probate court ruled against the widow and
awarded the purchaser attorney's fees on the basis that the widow filed her
bill of review in bad faith. The appeals court found that the widow had the
right to raise her complaints in a bill of review and that the probate court's
confirmation order was inappropriate because the probate court had not first
entered an order authorizing the sale of the property. 12 1
In McAdams v. Capital Products Corp. 122 the Fort Worth court of appeals
held that the statute of limitations barred an administrator's claim when the
administrator had no authority to pursue the claim in a representative ca-
pacity at the time she filed her original pleading and she did not receive
authority to do so until after the statute of limitations had run.' 23 The ad-
ministrator had been appointed administrator of her daughter's estate in Ar-
kansas. The administrator filed a DTPA claim in Texas in her capacity as
administrator even though no Texas court had granted her authority to act
on behalf of her daughter's estate. The administrator filed her original claim
within two years of her daughter's death, but she did not receive letters of
administration in Texas until well over three years following her daughter's
death. The appeals court found that the administrator did not assert her
claim in her capacity as a duly appointed Texas administrator until after the
statute of limitations had run and held that the amended petition could not
relate back to her original petition because she filed the original petition in a
representative capacity that she did not have. 124
118. 806 S.W.2d at 229-30 (Mauzy, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that following TEx.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 328(b) (Vernon 1980) would allow the court to determine the parties'
substantive rights. Id. at 230.
119. 807 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
120. Id. at 451.
121. Id. The court stated that both the order of sale and the confirmation order are neces-
sary under the Probate Code. Id. at 450. The court found that the probate court could not
enter an order confirming the sale without first authorizing the sale in an order. Id. at 451,
citing Ball v. Collins, 5 S.W. 622, 623 (Tex. 1887) and Loving v. Clark, 228 S.W. 590, 593-94
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1921, no writ).
122. 810 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).




In Crenshaw v. Chapman 125 the Waco court of appeals determined that
the trial court had improperly denied a co-executor her right to a jury
trial. 126 The decedent died testate in 1988. The court appointed the dece-
dent's surviving spouse and his daughter from a prior marriage as co-execu-
tors pursuant to the terms of the decedent's will. A controversy arose
between the co-executors in 1989 when the spouse filed a declaratory judg-
ment action concerning the community versus separate property nature of
some of the estate assets. The daughter counterclaimed and alleged that her
step-mother had breached her fiduciary duty and grossly mismanaged the
estate. The spouse filed an answer to the counterclaim, made a jury demand
and paid the jury fee, then set the case for trial on the jury docket two
months after the date upon which the court coordinator set the trial. The
daughter then filed a motion to remove her step-mother as co-executor and
as co-trustee of the trust established by the decedent. The court ordered the
daughter's motion set for trial approximately one month prior to the date of
the jury setting. The court conducted a bench trial and removed the spouse
as co-executor and co-trustee and also placed a "freeze"' 127 on some assets
that the spouse had withdrawn from the estate in order to satisfy a specific
bequest. The spouse appealed and the appeals court found that the trial
court improperly denied the spouse her right to a jury trial.' 28 The court
found that the motion to remove that the daughter filed was merely an
amended pleading that should have been tried to the jury. 129 The court also
found that the trial court's imposition of a "freeze" upon the assets with-
drawn to satisfy the specific bequest amounted to a temporary injunction
that the trial court improperly granted.' 30 The trial court failed to set a
bond in connection with the temporary injunction 131 and it also failed to set
a date for hearing on the issues underlying the request for temporary
injunction. 132
In Lesikar v. Rappeport 133 the Texarkana court of appeals determined
that a co-executor should make a partial distribution of the estate to the
other co-executor because the estate had sufficient assets to pay its debts.' 34
The decedent named his two daughters co-executors of his will and gave
each of the daughters a life estate in one-half of his residuary estate. One of
the daughters assumed the bulk of the work connected with estate adminis-
tration. The other daughter first petitioned for distribution of the estate
some six years following the decedent's death, which resulted in an earlier
125. 814 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, no writ).
126. Id. at 402.
127. Id. at 401.




131. TEX. R. Civ. P. 684 provides that the court must require the person seeking a tempo-
rary injunction to file a bond.
132. TEX. R. Civ. P. 683 requires the trial court to set a hearing on the underlying issues.
133. 809 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).
134. Id. at 251. The court stated that all of the estate's assets are liable for the estate's
debts, although this estate had more than adequate cash to pay the debts. Id.
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appeal. 135 The court at that time remanded the case to the trial court for a
determination of whether the necessity for administration still existed. On
remand, the jury found that the estate still required administration and that
a partial distribution would result in committing waste or injuring creditors.
On the second appeal, the court found that the estate could make a partial
distribution without committing waste 136 and that a partial distribution of
estate assets would not harm the estate's creditors. 37 The court also found
that evidence supported the validity of the executor's deduction from an in-
come distribution for amounts the beneficiary owed the estate. 138 On mo-
tion for rehearing, 139 the court awarded the co-executor against whom the
action was brought her attorney's fees because the jury found that she de-
fended the action in good faith. 14°
D. Closing Independent Administrations
In two related cases, Hanau v. Betancourt 14 1 and Estate of Hanau,142 the
Corpus Chrisit court of appeals considered the effect of the filing of a verified
final account in an independent administration. 143 Both cases arise from the
same estate and concern the ongoing conflict between the decedent's two
children from a previous marriage and his surviving spouse, who served as
independent executor. In Hanau v. Betancourt 1" the children sought man-
damus relief to force the trial court to enforce its order that the surviving
spouse distribute particular stocks to them. The independent executor had
filed a verified final account, which terminated the estate administration
under Probate Code section 151(b). 145 The court noted that the executor
would still be liable individually if she were found guilty of mismanagement
or if she made any false statements in the closing affidavit.' 46 The court
denied the petition for writ of mandamus because the children had an ade-
135. In re Estate of Lewis, 749 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied).
For a discussion of the opinion in that case, see Lynne McNiel Candler, Wills and Trusts,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw. L.J. 305, 308 (1989).
136. 809 S.W.2d at 250. The court stated that delivery of estate assets to the beneficiary
might actually prevent waste. Id. The court found that the result does not change merely
because the distribution would be to a life tenant and that delivery of the life estate to the life
tenant is not an invasion of corpus. Id.
137. Id. at 251. The court also stated that "an estate representative may not indefinitely
prolong administration simply by delaying the payment of debts when there are sufficient as-
sets to pay them." Id.
138. Id. The other co-executor had incurred the expenses and paid them in connection
with production costs on oil and gas leases and operating expenses on a ranch. The court
found that the evidence supported a reduction from the beneficiary's distribution for repay-
ment of those amounts. Id.
139. The opinion on Motion for Rehearing is published both at 806 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ) and 809 S.W.2d at 252-53.
140. 806 S.W.2d at 263; 809 S.W.2d at 252.
141. 800 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, orig. proceding).
142. 806 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
143. Hanau v. Betancourt, 800 S.W.2d at 373; Estate of Hanau, 806 S.W.2d at 904.
144. 800 S.W.2d 371.
145. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 151(b) (Vernon 1980).
146. 800 S.W.2d at 373. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 151(c) (Vernon 1980) provides that
beneficiaries under a will may enforce their rights under the will by a law suit.
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quate remedy at law. 147 In Estate of Hanau 148 the court determined that the
executor had in fact met all the requirements of Probate Code section 151149
in her final account and that the trial court correctly found that the executor
terminated the independent administration by filing the verified final
account. 150
V. GUARDIANSHIPS
In Malouf v. Malaula 151 the Waco court of appeals held that the district
court in which a medical malpractice trial occurred had jurisdiction over the
award of attorney's fees in that case rather than the probate court that had
jurisdiction over the guardianship of the ward who was the subject of the
district court action. 52 Prior to filing the application for guardianship in the
county in which they resided, the ward's parents filed a medical malpractice
suit as next friends of their child in district court in another county. The
parents entered into a contingent fee arrangement with the attorney under
the terms of which the attorney would receive fifty percent of the award in
the case. The district court appointed the appellant guardian ad litem to
represent the minor's interests in the malpractice action. During the pen-
dency of the district court action the parents instituted a guardianship and
the county court sitting in probate appointed the father as guardian of the
ward's estate. The probate court authorized the guardian to settle the medi-
cal malpractice suit and specifically ordered the guardian to pay such sums
as fees and costs as the district court ordered. The district court approved
the settlement of the malpractice case and disbursed forty percent of the
settlement to the minor's attorney. Prior to the entry of the judgment ap-
proving the settlement, the district court removed the guardian ad litem.
The former ad litem filed a motion for new trial in the district court follow-
ing the entry of the judgment in an attempt to reduce the attorney's fees.
The district court found that the former ad litem lacked standing to file the
motion for new trial, as did the Dallas court of appeals when the ad litem
attempted to appeal the judgment.153 The ad litem then filed a motion with
the probate court asking the court to disallow the claim of the attorney's fees
in the district court action.' 54 The ad litem appealed the county court's de-
147. 800 S.W.2d at 373. The court noted that the children had already instituted suit
against the executor individually and in her capacity as executor in Harris County prior to
filing the writ of mandamus. Id. at 372.
148. 806 S.W.2d 900.
149. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 151(a) (Vernon 1980).
150. 806 S.W.2d at 904. The court also found that the probate court lost probate jurisdic-
tion when the executor closed the estate by filing the final account so that it had no jurisdiction
to remove the independent executor and name the son as successor independent executor. Id.
The court noted that the removal of the independent executor and appointment of a successor
was moot once the estate was closed. Id.
151. 802 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-Waco 1990, writ denied).
152. Id. at 269.
153. The Dallas court of appeals also dismissed the ad litem's mandamus action for the
same reason. The ad litem did not appeal the Dallas appeals court's decision and the judgment
became final.
154. Technically the attorney did not present a claim to the guardian. The thrust of the ad
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nial of this motion to the Waco court of appeals on the bases that the district
court did not have jurisdiction to approve the attorney's claim for fees
against the minor's estate and that the amount of the award exceeded the
statutory limit for contingency fees under Probate Code section 233.155 The
appeals court found that the district court acquired jurisdiction over the
medical malpractice action at the time the parents filed the action and that
the guardianship proceeding that they later instituted did not divest the dis-
trict court of its jurisdiction.1 56 The court also found that the limitations
imposed by Probate Code section 233157 did not apply at the time the par-
ents entered into the fee contract with the malpractice attorney and could
not retroactively impair the terms of the contract. 158
In Williams v. Scanlan 159 a Houston court of appeals withdrew its order
granting the relator's motion for leave to file petition for .writ of mandamus
and overruled the motion because the respondent scheduled the trial on the
underlying fact issues.1 60 The dissent strongly disagreed with the court's
decision because the effect of the decision was to postpone relator's right to
control her community property.' 61 The relator's husband developed
Alzheimer's disease after they had been married for thirty-five years. The
couple had a community estate worth approximately six million dollars at
the time of the diagnosis. The couple had no children, and the husband had
no siblings. An accountant who had formerly worked for the couple, but
who the relator discharged for theft and attempts to convert the couple's
assets to his own use, filed an application for temporary guardianship. The
court appointed the accountant the temporary guardian and turned over the
community estate to the accountant. The relator demanded that the court
order the accountant to turn the estate back over to her pursuant to Probate
Code section 157.162 The relator also demanded that the guardian deliver all
of the community property to her under the provisions of Probate Code sec-
litem's argument to the county court was that the forty percent fee that the district court
awarded was in excess of the one-third maximum contingency fee authorized by TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 233 (Vernon 1980).
155. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 233 (Vernon 1980).
156. 802 S.W.2d at 269. The court stated that the district court's jurisdiction dominated
the county court's jurisdiction because the district court first acquired jurisdiction over the
determination of the attorney's fee. Id.
157. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 233 (Vernon 1980).
158. 802 S.W.2d at 270.
159. 807 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 901-04 (Sears, J., dissenting).
162. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 157 (Vernon 1980) provides that the spouse of the person
that the court declares is incompetent shall have the following rights and powers:
manage, control, and dispose of the entire community estate, including the part
which the incompetent spouse would legally have power to manage in the ab-
sence of such incompetency ..... Guardianship of the estate of the incompetent
spouse shall not be necessary when the other spouse is competent unless the
incompetent spouse owns separate property, and then as to such separate prop-
erty only. The qualification of a guardian of the estate of an incompetent spouse
does not deprive the competent spouse of the right to manage, control, and dis-
pose of the entire community estate as provided in this Code.
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tion 158.163 The dissent noted that the guardian had denied the relator the
use of her property for nine months although the guardian had identified no
separate property of the incompetent spouse. 164
In Cone v. Gregory 165 a Houston court of appeals overruled the relator's
petition for writ of mandamus in which the relator sought to avoid the trans-
fer of a cause of action from a Harris County probate court to the district
court in Lubbock County. 166 The relator, who was the guardian of the es-
tates of her minor children, filed suit in the probate court against their fa-
ther, who served as trustee of a trust created for the benefit of the children.
The relator alleged in the suit that the trustee breached his fiduciary duty,
was negligent, and self-dealt, and she asked for an accounting, damages, and
removal of the trustee. The trustee maintained that the suit properly be-
longed in the district court in Lubbock County, which is the county in which
the trustee resided. 167 The appeals court concluded that the district court
had jurisdiction over the suit.' 68 The appeals court indicated that venue in
Lubbock County may be incorrect, but, if so, the guardian may attack the
venue on appeal after final judgment. 169
VI. TRUSTS
A. Resulting Trusts
In Tricentrol Oil Trading, Inc. v. Annesley1 70 the Texas supreme court
found that an individual who held seats on the New York Mercantile Ex-
change actually held the seats in trust for the benefit of his former em-
ployer. 17 1 The corporate employer purchased the seats and placed them in
the individual's name while he served as vice president of the corporation.
The corporation's owner later sold the corporation and the new owner ter-
minated the individual's employment. The individual failed to advise the
new owner of the existence of the seats during negotiations of a release re-
sulting from the termination. When the corporation later learned about the
seats, it sought to recover them from the individual. The court held that the
163. TEX. PROs. CODE ANN. § 158 (Vernon 1980) provides that the guardian shall deliver
community property to the competent spouse upon demand.
164. 807 S.W.2d at 903.
165. 814 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. App.-Houston 1991 [1st Dist.], no writ).
166. Id. at 414, 415.
167. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 115.002(b) (Vernon 1984) provides that the proper venue
for an action involving a trust is in the county of the trustee's residence. TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 115.001(a) (Vernon 1984) provides that the district court has exclusive jurisdiction
over a suit to remove a trustee.
168. 814 S.W.2d at 414. The court noted that TEX. PROS. CODE ANN. § 5A(c) (Vernon
Supp. 1992) provides that the probate court and the district court have concurrent jurisdiction
over certain matters incident to an estate. 814 S.W.2d at 414. Because TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 115.001(a) (Vernon 1984) provides that the district court has exclusive jurisdiction
over actions involving the removal of a trustee, the district court has jurisdiction under both
the Probate Code and the Property Code, so the court concluded that the district court prop-
erly had jurisdiction. 814 S.W.2d at 414.
169. Id. at 415.
170. 809 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. 1991).
171. Id. at 220-21.
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release had no effect on the ownership of the seats and stated that the indi-
vidual had a duty to convey the seats to the corporation upon his termina-
tion. 172  In Jordan v. Exxon Corp. 173 the Texarkana court of appeals
determined that the conveyance of mineral interests to an individual as
trustee failed to create either an express trust 174 or a resulting trust. 17 5
B. Constructive Trusts
In Monnig's Department Stores, Inc. v. Azad Oriental Rugs, Inc. (In re
Monnig's Department Stores) 176 the Fifth Circuit examined the elements of a
constructive trust 177 and determined that no constructive trust arose because
no evidence of wrongdoing existed on the part of Monnig's.17 8  In Texas
Commerce Bank-El Paso, N.A. v. Marsh Media of El Paso (In re Carolin
Paxson Advertising, Inc.) 179 the Fifth Circuit determined that the debtor did
not hold assets in a constructive trust for the benefit of the creditors, who
172. Id. at 220. The court found that the individual had a duty to convey the seats to the
corporation at the time that the corporation requested that he do so. Id.
173. 802 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).
174. IdM at 882. The individual took title to the mineral interests as trustee, but no one
produced a written document creating a trust. The son of the man who took title to the
property testified at trial that his father did not execute a written trust agreement and never
executed a written document in which he identified the beneficiaries of the trust, the terms of
the trust, or provisions for a successor trustee. The court held that the deed's designation of
the individual as trustee was insufficient to create a trust. Id. The court noted that TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 111.001-123.005 (Vernon 1984 and Vernon Supp. 1992) require a writ-
ten trust instrument for a trust holding real property. Id.
175. 802 S.W.2d at 883. The court stated that law will imply a trust, known as a resulting
trust, either when an express trust fails or when one person takes title to property for which
another has provided the purchase price. Id. at 882-83, citing Nolana Dev. Ass'n v. Corsi, 682
S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. 1984). The conveyance of the mineral interest to the individual as
trustee does not manifest the intention on anyone's part to create a trust, the court determined,
so no resulting trust arose. Id. at 883.
176. 929 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1991).
177. Id. at 201. The elements identified by the court are as follows: "(1) Breach of an
informal relationship of special trust or confidence arising prior to and apart from the transac-
tion in question, or actual fraud .... ; (2) Unjust enrichment of the wrongdoer .... ; (3)
Tracing to an identifiable res." Id. (citations omitted). The court stated that a constructive
trust is an equitable remedy that prevents unjust enrichment. Id
178. Id. at 203. Azad sold oriental rugs on Monnig's premises under the terms of a license
agreement with Monnig's. Azad and Monnig's had operated under the terms of the agreement
over two years at the time Monnig's filed for bankruptcy protection. Under the terms of the
license agreement, Azad deposited the proceeds from the sale of the rugs in Monnig's cash
registers and utilized Monnig's charge slips for customers who wished to charge their
purchases. Monnig's undertook all collections on the charged accounts. On the twentieth day
of each month Monnig's paid Azad the proceeds that he generated from the sale of his rugs the
previous month less applicable taxes and a commission Azad agreed to pay Monnig's under
the license agreement. Based on these facts the court determined that no fiduciary relationship
existed between Monnig's and Azad. Id. at 202. The court further found that Monnig's did
not breach a fiduciary relationship even if a fiduciary relationship had existed. Id. The parties
had no agreement segregating the proceeds from Azad's sales from other sales proceeds col-
lected by Monnig's. The court found that the relationship between Azad and Monnig's most
closely resembled that of creditor and debtor and that Monnig's must be guilty of more wrong-
doing than nonpayment of a debt before the court would impress a constructive trust. Id. at
203.
179. 938 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1991).
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accordingly could not claim a status other than as conventional creditors.18 0
In Mims v. Beall 18 1 the Texarkana court of appeals found that the trial court
correctly imposed a constructive trust when an individual breached his fidu-
ciary duty to owners of a nonparticipating royalty interest by leasing miner-
als for an unreasonably low royalty interest. 8 2
C. Trustees
In Nacol v. McNutt '83 a Houston court of appeals examined issues sur-
rounding a contract for construction of a barn. The woman who contracted
for construction of the barn claimed that she entered the contract not in her
individual capacity, but in her capacity as trustee for her grandchildren.
The jury found that the contractor contracted for construction of the barn,
that the contractor substantially performed under the contract, and deter-
mined the amount unpaid under the contract for the contractor's services
and materials. The grandmother appealed, alleging that she entered the con-
tract in her fiduciary capacity and her grandchildren did not receive proper
notice of the trial. The court found that the grandchildren received adequate
notice because they had their own counsel present at trial who fully repre-
sented their interests.' 84 The court also found that the trustee had the bur-
den to prove that she avoided personal liability on the contract by entering
the contract only in her capacity as trustee.' 85 The jury found that the
grandmother did not inform the contractor that she was contracting only in
her fiduciary capacity. Because the grandmother did not meet her burden of
proof, she could not escape personal liability on the contract.
In Hollenbeck v. Hanna 18 6 the San Antonio court of appeals found that a
trustee owed a duty to provide an accounting to a remainder beneficiary
180. Id. at 598-99. The debtor, an advertising agency, bought broadcasting air time for its
clients. The stations billed the debtor for the advertising time, after which the debtor billed its
clients for the advertising time plus its commission, and then paid the stations. Texas Com-
merce Bank had taken and perfected a security interest in the debtor's accounts receivables
approximately two years prior to the time the debtor filed for bankruptcy protection. The
stations claimed that they were entitled to payment on the accounts receivable that represented
air time they sold to the debtor. The bankruptcy court found that the debtor held the accounts
receivable in a constructive trust for the benefit of the stations and the district court affirmed
the bankruptcy court's decision. The court of appeals found that the debtor was not an agent
of the stations. Id. Because the debtor and the stations only had a independent contractor
relationship, the stations stood in the position of a regular creditor. See id. at 599.
181. 810 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).
182. Id. at 881. The landowners leased the minerals on their property to their son, who in
turn assigned the lease to a third party. The landowners failed to reserve enough of a mineral
interest in the lease so that the nonparticipating royalty owners would be assured of receiving
their portion of the royalties. The trial court instructed the jury that the holder of executive
rights over mineral interests owes nonparticipating royalty owners a fiduciary duty. The jury
found that the holder breached his fiduciary duty and found actual and exemplary damages.
The appeals court held that sufficient evidence existed that the landowners breached their
fiduciary duty and upheld the judgment, id., but reformed the judgment to reflect the actual
amount of the damages.
183. 797 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
184. Id. at 154.
185. Id. at 155.
186. 802 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
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under both the terms of Trust Code section 113.151187 and the will that
created the trust.18 8 The decedent left his family ranch in trust for the bene-
fit of his spouse for her lifetime, with remainder to their daughter. The es-
tate elected a special use valuation under Internal Revenue Code section
2032A.18 9 The decedent provided in his will that his daughter would have
ongoing management responsibilities over the ranch in order to preserve the
special use valuation. The will stated that the trustee would make annual
accounts and provide a copy to the decedent's spouse. The daughter re-
quested that the trustee provide her with a copy of the accounting, but the
trustee refused. The daughter brought suit to compel the accounting, and
the probate court found that the trustee did not have to provide the account-
ing to the daughter as a remainder beneficiary. The probate court based its
decision on an interpretation of the will and section 113.151 of the Trust
Code. 190 The probate court determined that, under the terms of the will, the
trustee only had to provide the annual account information to the decedent's
spouse during her lifetime. The probate court also found that the terms of
the will overrode Trust Code provisions concerning accountings. The ap-
peals court determined that the probate court incorrectly interpreted the will
because the will did not specifically state that the trustee should not give a
copy of the accounting to the remainder beneficiary. 191 The court also found
that Trust Code section 113.151192 mandates that the trial court determine
whether the beneficiary's interest is sufficient to require the trustee to pro-
vide an accounting to the beneficiary and that the probate court failed to
make a finding on this issue. 193 The court thus reversed the order that de-
nied the accounting and remanded the cause for determination of whether
the remainder beneficiary had sufficient interest in the trust to receive an
accounting. 194
In Ashmore v. North Dallas Bank & Trust 195 the Dallas court of appeals
held that the successor trustee failed to file an appeal in a timely manner on
two orders awarding attorney's fees and custodial fees and that the probate
court properly awarded custodial fees and expenses in the one order for
which the trustee filed a timely appeal. 196 The bank, which served as succes-
sor trustee of several trusts for the benefit of one family, resigned as trustee
in December 1987. The bank requested the trust advisors, who had the req-
uisite authority, to appoint a successor trustee. The bank also filed a petition
with the probate court for appointment of a successor trustee and for in-
187. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.151 (Vernon 1984).
188. See 802 S.W.2d at 415.
189. I.R.C. § 2032A. This section allows real property used in farming or other trades or
businesses to qualify for a lower appraised value for federal estate tax purposes under certain
circumstances.
190. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.151 (Vernon 1984).
191. 802 S.W.2d at 414.
192. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.151 (Vernon 1984).
193. 802 S.W.2d at 415.
194. Id.
195. 804 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
196. Id. at 160.
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structions on how to handle trust assets until the appointment of a successor.
Approximately a year after its resignation, the bank, which was still serving
as custodian of the trust assets, filed applications with the probate court for
attorney's fees for the period from the resignation until shortly before the
date of the application and trustee's fees through the date the probate court
appointed a temporary receiver. The probate court signed two orders
awarding the fees on January 4, 1989. In June 1989, the probate court ap-
pointed the temporary receiver as successor trustee of the trusts and ordered
the bank to submit a final account to the successor trustee. In October 1989,
the bank filed an application for payment of custodian's fees and the probate
court entered an order on January 3, 1990, authorizing the payment of part
of the custodial fees the bank requested. The successor trustee appealed all
three orders on February 2, 1990. The appeals court first found that the
January 1989 orders were final, appealable orders. 197 Because the successor
trustee brought his appeal more than one year after the probate court en-
tered the orders, he did not appeal the orders in a timely manner and the
appeals court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeals. 198 The court then
examined the January 1990 award of custodial fees and determined that the
probate court properly awarded the custodial fees.' 99
D. Modification and Construction of Trusts
In Musick v. Reynolds2 °° the Eastland court of appeals examined the al-
leged modification of an irrevocable spendthrift trust and determined that, as
a matter of law, an irrevocable spendthrift trust may be modified 20' and that
the grantor and beneficiaries of the trust at issue had modified the trust pur-
suant to a settlement agreement and related documents. 202 The grantor
funded the trust with two tracts of land. The ownership of one of the tracts
of land was the subject of litigation several years after the grantor established
the trust. As a result of a settlement agreement designed to resolve the dis-
putes between the parties concerning the ownership of the land, the parties
agreed that the grantor's two nephews would receive an undivided one-sixth
beneficial interest in the tract in dispute, and the grantor released any ability
197. Id. at 158.
198. Id. at 158-59.
199. Id. at 160. The bank continued to hold the trust assets, prepared accountings, paid
bills, and performed many other functions at the request of the temporary receiver/successor
trustee. The court found that neither the trust agreements did not prohibit the award of fees
nor the holding in James v. Roberts Tel. & Elec. Co., 206 S.W. 933 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1918,
judgm't adopted), prevented the award of custodial fees to the bank. 804 S.W.2d at 159. The
court distinguished James because the holding in that case was that a receiver could not re-
ceive fees for his services, not that a custodian could not receive fees for its services. Id.
Finally, the court found that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in determining the
amount of custodial fees to award. Id.
200. 798 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990, writ denied).
201. Id. at 629. The court relied on the holding in Sayers v. Baker, 171 S.W.2d 547, 551
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1943, no writ) to determine that if the settlor of the trust is alive
and all trust beneficiaries consent, the settlor and all the beneficiaries may consent to modifica-
tion of the trust. 798 S.W.2d at 629.
202. Id. at 630.
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that he had to terminate the nephews' interest in the trust. Additionally, the
trustee deeded a one-sixth interest to each nephew subject to any of three
conditions precedent: (1) the grantor terminated the trust; (2) the trustee
terminated the trust pursuant to the terms of the trust agreement; or (3) the
grantor revised the trust in an effort to revise the nephews' ownership inter-
ests in the tract of land. The nephews quitclaimed all of their interest in the
other parcel of land held in the trust, which the trustee later sold. The gran-
tor died and left his estate to the trust, including a 100 acre tract of land.
The nephews brought an action in May 1985 in which they sought a deter-
mination that they held an equal beneficial interest under the trust with the
grantor's two daughters. The trial court granted a summary judgment
against the nephews based upon the settlement agreement reached in the
earlier litigation. The appeals court determined that an issue of fact existed
concerning whether the nephews owned any beneficial interest in the 100
acre tract of land held in the trust and remanded for a trial court
determination. 20 3
In Myrick v. Moody2°4 a Houston court of appeals determined that the
language of a trust document was ambiguous and that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment. 20 5 The grantor created a trust for the benefit
of three of his children and the children of his fourth child. The trust docu-
ment specified that the trust would continue for the lives of his children. On
the death of a beneficiary of the trust who was a child of the grantor, that
child's share of the trust would be distributed to the child's descendants per
stirpes. On the death of the grantor's son who was not a trust beneficiary,
his children would receive their share of the trust estate. One of the gran-
tor's children died in 1936, survived by two children, and the trustee distrib-
uted one-fourth of the trust corpus to the children of the deceased child.
Two of the children of the son who was not a beneficiary of the trust died
and the trustee paid income to their children. One of the grantor's children
died in 1986 without surviving issue and the trustee filed a declaratory judg-
ment for a determination of who the beneficiaries of the deceased benefici-
ary's share were.20 6 The trial court determined that the deceased child's
share of the income should be evenly divided between her surviving sibling
and the surviving grandchild beneficiary. The appeals court held that the
trial court correctly determined this issue. 20 7 The court then examined
203. Id. at 630-31.
204. 802 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
205. Id. at 739.
206. The trust provision for distribution of a share held for the benefit of a child who died
without issue stated that the share would be distributed equally to the child's surviving broth-
ers and sisters, with one share going to the surviving children of the child who was not a trust
beneficiary. At the time the grantor's child died, two of his children survived, one of whom
was a trust beneficiary and the other of whom was the father of the grandchildren beneficiaries
of the trust. Only one of the grandchildren beneficiaries of the trust survived at that time. The
trustee asked the trial court to determine how to distribute the portion of the share that should
pass to the grandchildren beneficiaries when only one of the grandchildren then survived, but
the deceased grandchildren beneficiaries had surviving issue who were also beneficiaries of the
trust.
207. 802 S.W.2d at 738.
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whether the trial court correctly determined the method of corpus distribu-
tion. The trial court found that the language of the trust document unam-
biguously required survivorship of the grantor's child and grandchild in
order to receive a corpus distribution. The appeals court found that the lan-
guage controlling distribution of the corpus was ambiguous and found that
the trial court thus incorrectly granted summary judgment. 208
VII. LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
A. Probate Jurisdiction
The legislature passed two acts that relate to probate jurisdiction. 2 9 The
legislature first amended section 21.009 of the Government Code210 to re-
move statutory probate courts from the definition of statutory county
courts211 and to add the definition of statutory probate court contained in
Probate Code section 3212 as a separate type of county court.213 The legisla-
ture added new sections 25.0026 through 25.0032 to the Government
Code,214 which relate to the powers and duties of statutory probate
courts,215 juries, 216 compensation of judges, fees, facilities, and the seal of
208. Id. at 739. The court stated that the language could require survivorship among the
original beneficiaries or it could require survivorship among the grantor's children, but not
among the grandchildren beneficiaries. Id. The trust provided for the corpus distribution to
the "surviving brothers and sisters [of the deceased beneficiary] and the children of [the son
who was not a beneficiary], collectively." See id. The court found that the use of the term
"surviving" placed only in front of "brothers and sisters" rather than in front of both "broth-
ers and sisters" and "children" was ambiguous. Id.
209. Act of May 17, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 394, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1506
(Vernon); Act of May 17, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 746, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2620
(Vernon). In addition to these acts, the legislature passed two acts applicable to county courts
in specific counties. Act of May 25, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 441, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
1608, 1609 (Vernon) (creates County Court at Law of Hopkins County and conveys concur-
rent jurisdiction over probate matters with the county court); Act of May 22, 1991, 72nd Leg.,
R.S., ch. 512, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1789, 1789-91 (Vernon) (El Paso County Court at
Law No. 6 designated the Probate Court of El Paso County).
210. TEX. GoV'T CODE § 21.009 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
211. Act of May 17, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 394, § 1, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1506,
1506 (Vernon), amending TEX. Gov'T CODE § 21.009(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
212. TEX. PROB. CODE § 3(ii) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
213. Act of May 26, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 594, § 1, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1506,
1506 (Vernon).
214. TEX. Gov'T CODE §§ 25.0026-.0032 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
215. New § 25.0026 of the Government Code lists the powers and duties of a statutory
probate court or its judge. These powers and duties include the following: (1) the power to
issue writs for enforcement of the court's jurisdiction and writs of habeas corpus if the case
involves an offense within the probate court's jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of any inferior
court in the county; (2) the power to punish persons for contempt; (3) and all other powers,
duties, immunities, and privileges provided to other county judges by statute. A county pro-
bate judge may not, however, exercise authority over the administrative business of the county
that is performed by the county judge. In the Act of June 16, 1991, ch. 746, § 7, 1991 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 2620, 2622 (Vernon), the legislature added new § 25.0026, with the same lan-
guage, to the Government Code.
216. New Government Code § 25.0027 provides for the method of selecting jury panels.
Both the Act of May 26, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 394, § 3, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1506,
1507 (Vernon) and the Act of May 27, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 746, § 8, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law




The legislature further amended and repealed various sections of the Gov-
ernment Code that relate to county courts. 218 In an overlapping effort, the
legislature amended section 21.009(2) of the Government Code2 19 to remove
statutory probate courts, with the exception of the Brazoria County statu-
tory probate court, from the definition of statutory county courts.220 Effec-
tive October 1, 1991, a statutory probate court is the only statutory county
court with probate jurisdiction in counties that have statutory probate
courts.221 In all other counties, statutory county courts have concurrent
probate jurisdiction with the county court as provided by general law.222
B. Wills
The legislature amended section 10A of the Probate Code223 to add chari-
table organizations that are distributees under a will as necessary parties to a
will contest or will construction suit. 224 The legislature has amended section
58 of the Probate Code225 to provide that one may not dispose of an expec-
tancy by will226 and to provide that in a will one may disinherit an heir and
direct the disposition passing under the will or by intestacy.227 Probate
Code section 3(f) 228 now defines "will" as an instrument that may direct
how one wishes not to dispose of property229 in order to make the definition
of "will" consistent with the revisions to section 58.230 A charitable or gov-
section 25.00261 of the Government Code will not apply to statutory probate courts in Dallas
County.
217. Act of May 26, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 394, § 2, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1506,
1507 (Vernon).
218. Act of May 27, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch.746, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2620-39
(Vernon). This act is quite lengthy and addresses many areas, besides probate, that concern
county courts.
219. TEX. GOV'T. CODE § 21.009(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
220. Act of May 27, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 746, § 1, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2620,
2620 (Vernon).
221. Act of May 27, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 746, § 3, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2620,
2620-21 (Vernon), adding TEX. Gov'T CODE § 25.003(e).
222. Id., adding TEX. Gov'T CODE § 25.003(d) (effective October 1, 1991).
223. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 10A (Vernon Supp. 1992).
224. Act of May 21, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 675, § 1, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2455,
2455-56 (Vernon). TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 10A previously provided that institutions of
higher education that were distributees under a will were necessary parties in a will contest or
will construction suit. The court must serve the charitable organization in the manner pro-
vided in the Probate Code for service on other parties. Charitable organizations that are dis-
tributees under a will are necessary parties only if proceedings instituting the contest or will
construction suit begin on or after September 1, 1991.
225. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
226. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 6, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3064 (Vernon) (amends TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58(a).
227. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 6, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3064 (adds TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58(b).
228. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(6f) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
229. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 1, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3062 (Vernon) (amends TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(6f)).
230. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(6) (Vernon Supp. 1992). The legislature also amended
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.053 to echo the provision that one may direct how not to
dispose of property. See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
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ernmental beneficiary has until nine months from the date it receives notice
of the probate proceedings, as required under section 128A of the Probate
Code, 231 to file a written disclaimer rather than the nine months from the
date of the decedent's death that pertains to other beneficiaries. 232
Probate Code section 59233 now provides that a signature to a self-proving
affidavit may serve as a signature to the will. 234 The legislature further
amended Probate Code section 59235 to modify the statutory form of a will's
self-proving affidavit.236 The legislature amended the section heading of
Probate Code section 67237 to indicate that the section refers to a pretermit-
ted child rather than a pretermitted heir.238 The legislature extensively re-
vised Probate Code section 68,239 which is commonly known as the "anti-
lapse" statute, to cure several problems that existed with the previous ver-
sion of the statute.24°
231. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 128A (Vernon Supp. 1992).
232. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 2, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3062 (Vernon) (amends TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A).
233. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
234. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 7, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3064-65 (Vernon). The legislature amended § 59 in order to cure a so-called "Boren" will,
named after the will at issue in Boren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966). The court held in
Boren v. Boren, id. at 729-30, and again in Wich v. Fletcher, 652 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. 1983),
that a will is not valid if the witnesses fail to sign the will itself, but instead sign only the self-
proving affidavit. Under the revision to § 59, a "Boren" will shall not be invalidated, but it
shall also not be admitted to probate as a properly executed self-proving will. Thus, the appli-
cant for probate shall have to offer the court proof of the execution of the will with proper
formalities under TEX. PROB. CODE § 84(b) (Vernon 1980) and proof of the legal capacity of
the testator to make the will under TEX. PROB. CODE § 88(b) (Vernon 1980).
235. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
236. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 7, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3064-65 (Vernon). The new form of the self-proving affidavit states that both the testator and
the witnesses swear to the will and its execution. Formerly, the testator acknowledged the will
and the witnesses swore to the information stated in the self-proving affidavit. In one case,
Cutler v. Ament, 726 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
the testator swore to the self-proving affidavit and the witnesses acknowledged the instrument.
The court held that the will was not self-proved because the witnesses acknowledged the docu-
ment. Id. at 607-08. The new form of the self-proving affidavit will eliminate this potential
problem. Fortunately, self-proving affidavits that comply with the language from § 59 prior to
this amendment will substantially comply with the new statute. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 59(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
237. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 67 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
238. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 8, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3066 (Vernon). Because the section deals with pretermitted children rather than pretermitted
heirs, the section heading now accurately reflects its content.
239. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 68 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
240. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 9, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3066 (Vernon). Previously, § 68 provided for the distribution of a devise intended for a prede-
ceased descendant to the predeceased descendant's issue. Section 68(a) extends this rule to the
descendants of the testator's parents. Thus, under the former statute, if a testator had devised
a gift to his child and the child predeceased him, the gift would have passed to the deceased
child's children, but the same result would not have followed if the testator devised a gift to his
sister and she had predeceased him; by amending the statute, the legislature cured this anom-
aly. Section 68(a) now clarifies that the provision for passage of a devise applies to class gifts
as well as to specific bequests, thus avoiding the issue raised in dictum in White v. Moore, 760
S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tex. 1988). A lapsed specific bequest will pass as part of the residuary estate
if it is not made to a descendant of the testator's parents under § 68(b). Section 68(c) changes




Both Probate Code sections 43241 and 45242 now provide for intestate dis-
tribution of property under a per capita with representation approach.243
The legislature has clarified that an affidavit of heirship is valid whether ac-
knowledged or verified by jurat.244
D. Estate Administration
Personal representatives must now provide additional information in the
published notice, including the time of issuance of letters, the address to
which the personal representative wishes claims to be presented, and the
personal representative's choice of how creditors should address the
claims.24 5 Personal representatives must now give notice to each creditor
having an unpaid claim against the estate within four months after the per-
sonal representative receives letters if the personal representative has knowl-
edge of the claim. 246 A personal representative may now purchase property
from an estate if the court approves the sale after determining that the sale is
in the estate's best interest and if the personal representative has previously
provided notice of the intended sale to each beneficiary and each creditor
whose claim remains unpaid.247
The legislature amended Probate Code section 145248 to provide that a
court may appoint a person who resigns or declines to serve as independent
executor or administrator of an estate as dependent executor or administra-
lapsed residuary bequests will pass to the other residuary beneficiaries; pursuant to § 68(d)
residuary bequests will now only pass by intestacy when all of the residuary beneficiaries have
predeceased the testator and none of them are descendants of the testator's parent.
241. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 43 (Vernon Supp. 1992). Section 43 provides for intestate
distribution of separate property. Formerly, § 43 did not clearly specify whether distribution
would be made under a "per capita with representation" approach or under a pure per stirpes
approach if the intestate had no surviving children, but had more distant surviving
descendants.
242. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 45 (Vernon Supp. 1992). Section 45 deals with inheritance
of the community estate of a decedent. It formerly provided for inheritance strictly on a per
stirpes basis.
243. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, §§ 3,4, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3064 (Vernon).
244. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 5, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3064 (Vernon) amends TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 52 to provide that sworn instruments, as
well as acknowledged instruments, may be recorded.
245. Act of May 21, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 464, § 1, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1686
(Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROa. CODE ANN. § 294(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992)). The personal
representative may choose to have the claims addressed in care of the personal representative,
the representative's attorney, or in care of the representative and naming the estate. Act of
May 21, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 464, § 1, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 1686.
246. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 13, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3067-68 (Vernon) amends TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 295(b). The legislature enacted this
change in order to ensure that the situation raised in Tulsa Professional Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485
U.S. 478 (1988), does not arise. The Court held in Pope that the personal representative must
give actual notice to reasonably ascertainable creditors prior to barring their claims against the
estate. 485 U.S. at 491.
247. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 14, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3068 (Vernon).
248. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 145 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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tor.249 Probate Code section 151250 now provides for the release of sureties
on bonds of a personal representative if the personal representative files a
closing report verified by the personal representative's affidavit and signed
receipts from the beneficiaries showing delivery of estate property after pay-
ment of all debts.2 51 Probate Code section 152252 now provides that the
probate court may require an independent executor to file an affidavit under
Probate Code section 151253 and may include a provision in the order dis-
charging the sureties on the bond from liability on the executor's future
acts.
2 54
The legislature has clarified that an executor or administrator may not
receive a commission for receiving funds on deposit at a financial institution
or with a brokerage house or for collecting life insurance proceeds unless the
executor or administrator applies to the court for reasonable compensation
for unusual effort in collecting the funds or life insurance proceeds.255 The
legislature extensively amended section 322A of the Probate Code256 and its
provisions controlling the apportionment of estate taxes and expenses for
persons dying after September 1, 1991.257 Under the new provisions of the
statute, the personal representative will charge each person who receives an
interest in the decedent's estate his or her proportionate share of the estate
tax258 unless the decedent has directed otherwise by inter vivos or testamen-
tary instrument.259 Further amendments to section 322A provide for the
249. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 10, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3066 (Vernon).
250. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 151 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
251. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 11, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3066-67 (Vernon). Previously, § 151(a) allowed the personal representative to file a final ac-
count, rather than a closing report, but provided no method for the release of a surety on the
bond. Section 15 1(e) extends the provisions of § 151 to a community administration to release
the sureties on the community administrator's bond upon the filing of an independent execu-
tor's affidavit.
252. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 152 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
253. Id. § 151.
254. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 12, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3067 (Vernon).
255. Act of May 22, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 468, § 1, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1695,
1695 (Vernon) (amending TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 241(a)). Section 2 of this act, 1991 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. at 1696, added TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 241(c) to provide a definition of
financial institution.
256. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322A (Vernon Supp. 1992).
257. Act of May 15, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 410, §§ 1, 2, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
1571, 1571-76 (Vernon). The legislature clarified the definition of estate tax contained in TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 322A(a)(2), although the definition now provides that any tax imposed
under I.R.C. § 2701(d)(1)(A) is not included within the definition of estate tax; interestingly,
I.R.C. § 2701(d)(l)(A) does not impose a tax. The legislature also amended the definitions of
"person" contained in TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322A(a)(3) and "person interested in the
estate" contained in TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322A(a)(4).
258. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 410, § 1, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1571,
1572 (Vernon) (amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322A(b)(1)). The approximate amount of
tax for which each recipient of the decedent's estate is responsible is determined by applying
the same ratio to the total estate tax as the recipient's portion of the estate bears to the total
estate. Id.
259. Act of May 15, 1991, 72nd Leg. R.S., ch. 410, § 1, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1571,
1572 (Vernon) (deleted the former language of TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322A(b)(2) and
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apportionment of taxes when special use valuation under Internal Revenue
Code section 2032A 260 applies26 1 or when excess retirement accumulation
creates a taxable situation 262 under Internal Revenue Code section
4980(d). 26 3 The legislature amended Probate Code section 378A 264 to clar-
ify existing law in Texas relating to pecuniary marital deduction bequests.2 65
E. Guardianships
A temporary guardianship may now last longer than sixty days if either
the application for temporary guardianship or the application to convert a
temporary guardianship to a permanent guardianship is subject to a chal-
lenge or contest. 266 The legislature passed a lengthy act that sets forth the
manner of determining relationships by consanguinity or affinity, among
other things;267 the manner of determining relationships appears to affect
only section 130E(b) of the Probate Code.268
added new language to the effect that the decedent can overrule the state law through written
instructions in the instrument that creates the interest).
260. I.R.C. § 2032A.
261. Act of May 15, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 410, § 1, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1571,
1573 (Vernon) (added new TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322A(i)); former § 322A(i) is now
§ 322A(p).
262. Id. at 1573-74 (added new TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322A(j)). The former § 322(j)
is now § 322A(q). Additional amendments to § 322A provide, among other things, under
§ 322A(k) that a recipient of specific property that gives rise to an extension in payment of the
estate tax shall receive the benefits and burdens of the extension, under § 322A(n) that the
personal representative has the right to recover tax from persons who receive nonprobate prop-
erty as the result of the decedent's death, and under § 322A(o) that any person who must pay
tax in a greater amount than otherwise provided under the statute because another will not pay
his or her proportionate amount of tax has the right of reimbursement from the person who
failed to pay his or her share of the tax.
263. I.R.C. § 4980(d).
264. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 378A (Vernon Supp. 1992).
265. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 15, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3068-69 (Vernon). The legislature made two amendments to § 378A. First, the legislature
amended the statute to allow it to apply to all bequests that qualify for the marital deduction,
whether or not the testator intended for the bequest to qualify for the deduction. The legisla-
ture next added new subsection § 378A(b), which provides that unless otherwise specified in
the governing instrument, assets funding the pecuniary marital bequest shall carry their value
on the date of distribution. The addition of § 378A(b) codifies existing law. The legislature
originally enacted § 378A to assure the satisfaction of the requirements of Rev. Proc. 64-19,
1964-1 C.B. 682, and the latest changes to § 378A carry forward that intent.
266. Act of April 29, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 97, §§ 1, 2, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 664,
664 (Vernon). The Act amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 131(g) to provide that, except as
provided in new subsection § 131(j), no temporary guardianship may last longer than sixty
days, and adds TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 131(j), which allows a temporary guardianship to
continue to the later of the date of the hearing on the contested or challenged matter or sixty
days after creation of the temporary guardianship.
267. Act of May 25, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 561, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1979
(Vernon) (added new TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5996h and revised the state nepotism
statutes. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5996h (Vernon Supp. 1992) seems to amend every
statute that contains reference to relationships by consanguinity or affinity.
268. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 130E(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992) states the method of giving




The legislature amended the sections of the Property Code269 that provide
the standards for trust management and investment. 270 Trust property sub-
ject to the standard of judgment and care of the trustee now includes any
"investment vehicle authorized for the collective investment of trust funds
pursuant to Part 9, Title 12, of the Code of Federal Regulations."' 27  In
order to determine whether the trustee has prudently made investment deci-
sions concerning the trust property, one must now look to the overall invest-
ment strategy of the trustee rather than the prudence of a single trust
investment. 272 Rather than listing specific types of investments that a
trustee may acquire and maintain in a trust, such as bonds, debentures,
stock, and other investments, section 113.056(b) 273 now provides that a
trustee may acquire every kind of investment that prudent persons would
acquire for themselves. 274 A trustor may now direct how trust assets shall
not be distributed in the event the trust fails, terminates, or is revoked. 275
Courts may now clearly reform noncharitable gifts and trusts to conform to
the general intent of the trustor if the gift violates the rule against perpetu-
ities. 276 A trustee may now divide a single trust into two or more separate
trusts without a judicial proceeding if the trustee determines that the divi-
sion of the trust could result in significant savings in federal transfer taxes or
any other taxes imposed on the trust property.277
269. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 113.056(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
270. Act of May 28, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 876, § 1, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2987,
2987-88 (Vernon).
271. Id., amending TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.056(a).
272. Act of May 28, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 876, § 1, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2987,
2988 (Vernon) (amended TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.056(a)). If the trustee invests in only
one investment vehicle, one must consider the overall performance of the investment vehicle,
rather than the performance of a single investment within the investment vehicle, in order to
determine whether the trustee prudently invested the trust assets.
273. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.056(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
274. Act of May 28, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 876, § 1, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2987,
2988 (Vernon) (amended TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.056(b)).
275. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 17, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3069 (Vernon) (amended TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.053). This provision is consistent with
the changes to TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 3(fl) and 58. See supra note 230 and accompanying
text.
276. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 16, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3069 (Vernon) amends TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.043(a) and (b) to state unequivocally that
the cy pres doctrine will apply to noncharitable gifts and trusts. Some recent Texas cases have
held that prior to this revision § 5.043 applied only to charitable gifts and trusts. See Foshee v.
Republic Nat'l Bank, 617 S.W.2d 675, 678-79 (Tex. 1981); Ball v. Knox, 768 S.W.2d 829, 832-
33 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ). Charitable gifts, however, are not subject
to the rule against perpetuities.
277. Act of May 24, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 895, § 18, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3062,
3069 (Vernon) (added TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.057 to allow the trustee to divide the
trust without judicial proceedings). The new trusts created by the division must have identical
terms with the exception of the tax elections that may be made for the new trusts. TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 112.057(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992). TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 112.057(a)(1) and
112.057(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992) provide for the method of dividing the trust and
§ 112.057(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992) provides for the method of allocating trust assets among the
new trusts. Additionally, a trustee may merge two or more trusts into one trust without a
judicial proceeding if he is not prevented from doing so by the terms of the trust instruments
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and if the merger would result in significant decreases in federal transfer taxes or any other
taxes imposed on the trust property. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.057(c) (Vernon Supp.
1992). A trustee may divide or merge a testamentary trust after the will has been admitted to
probate prior to receiving trust assets and may divide or merge an irrevocable inter vivos trust
prior to receiving trust assets. Id. § 112.057(d).
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